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Zusammenfassung
Der Aufsatz beschäftigt sich mit Russlands postkommunistischer
Sicherheitspolitik im Ostseeraum. Den Schwerpunkt bildet die Behauptung,
dass es einen Wandel im russischen Sicherheitsdenken und in den
Sicherheitsstrategien gab. Die "sanften" Sicherheitsbemühungen sind
wichtiger geworden als die "harten". Obgleich die militärische Problematik
noch immer von Bedeutung ist, konzentrieren sich Russlands Strategen auf
die weniger traditionellen Herausforderungen im Sicherheitsbereich – auf
die Hindernisse für Wirtschaft, Handel und den freien Verkehr von
Menschen und Waren, auf Umweltverschmutzung, Kriminalität über die
Landesgrenzen hinaus, Drogenhandel, Schmuggel, illegale Migration,
Seuchen, die Sicherheit bei der Energiegewinnung usw. Russland, der EU
und diversen Organisationen ist es gelungen, eine gemeinsame Agenda für
den "sanften" Sicherheitsbereich zu etablieren, obwohl noch viele Probleme
gelöst werden müssen und es weiterer Zusammenarbeit bedarf.
Alexander Sergounin is the Head of the Department of International
Relations & Political Science at Nizhny Novgorod Linguistic University in
Russia. The author would like to thank the following institutions for
financial support: International Policy Fellowship Program (Open Society
Institute), Inter-regional Studies in Social Sciences Program
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Im Anschluss an den Aufsatz befindet sich eine Liste der verwendeten
Abkürzungen.
Introduction
Moscow’s perceptions of, and its security policy towards, the Baltic Sea
region have changed dramatically over the past decade. The general trend
was from phobia or damage containment to cooperation. However, this
process was quite contradictory and turbulent. On the one hand, Russia
faced new challenges as a result of recent developments – the NATO and
EU enlargements, tensions with the Baltic States, the degradation of the
socio-economic and eco-systems in Northwest Russia, illegal migration,
cross-border crime and so on. On the other hand, the Baltic Sea region
(where Russia has its only border with the EU) offered numerous
opportunities for international cooperation. Russia’s northwestern regions,
such as Kaliningrad, Karelia, Novgorod the Great and St Petersburg, are
highly advanced sub-national units in terms of market reforms and
integration into the European economy. The EU has indicated its desire to
cooperate with Northwest Russia in areas such as energy, transportation,
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such a cooperation with a proper institutional framework, the EU launched
the Northern Dimension Initiative (NDI). Other sub-regional organizations,
such as the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), the Barents-
Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC), the Nordic Council, and the Nordic Council of
Ministers participated actively in collaborative projects with Russia. Even
the United States launched the so-called Northern Europe Initiative (NEI) to
tackle security problems in the region.1 This paper seeks to broaden the
understanding of Russian security policies in the Baltic Sea area by
considering the following research questions: 1) How did Russian security
concepts on the region change? 2) What major security problems does
Russia face in the region? 3) What are the possible (and best) solutions to
these problems?
Changing paradigms
The dynamic processes in the Baltic Sea area took the Russian political and
academic communities by surprise. For example, in the case of the NDI and
the NEI, it took Moscow almost two years to formulate its official strategy
towards these initiatives2 and to produce more or less thorough academic
analyses of the issues.3 Among Russian political and academic elites, there
are three main theoretical approaches to Moscow’s policies in the Baltic
Sea region:
1. Political realists and geopoliticians view the Baltic Sea region as a
manifestation of an eternal geopolitical rivalry between Russia and the
West. In contrast with its former policy, the West now prefers economic
rather than military instruments to pressurize Russia. According to these
paradigms, the aim of the EU policies is to secure Russia’s status as the
West’s “younger partner” and a source of cheap natural resources and labor
force.4 According to this school of thought, the West is not interested in a
revival of the local economy and it plans to make Northwestern Russia a
mere transit point in communications between the Russian regions that are
rich in natural resources and the EU and the Baltic States. This means that
foreign investment will be employed to develop a transport infrastructure
rather than to modernize local industry and agriculture. This group believes
that Russia’s attempts to become more open (for instance, the development
of free and special economic zones, e.g., the Kaliningrad SEZ) are
detrimental to the country’s economic security and serve only as a façade
for smugglers and corrupted officials.
Some realists believe that Western initiatives such as the Northern
Dimension are merely a vehicle for Western geopolitical ambitions. For
example, according to geopoliticians, Germany dreams of re-incorporating
the former East Prussia into the “German Empire”. The first step in this
geopolitical plan could be the establishment of a sort of German economic
protectorate over the Kaliningrad Region.5 These fears were widespread in
the region in early 2001, following emerging rumors that Germany would
cancel part of Russia’s debts in exchange for securities of Russian
companies (including the Kaliningrad-based firms). A series of rallies was
held in Kaliningrad, where the local residents appealed to President
Vladimir Putin to either confirm or deny these rumors.6
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of the West is to disintegrate Russia and separate the Northwest (especially
Kaliningrad and Karelia) from the rest of the country.7 The realists believe
that the region should retain its strategic importance and criticize the
government for the premature dismantling of a formidable military
infrastructure in the region. They recommend tightening governmental
control over the region to prevent its potential drift to the West. They believe
that in the case of ‘Western encroachments’ into the region, Moscow should
re-militarize the region, including the deployment of nuclear weapons.8
They also favor military cooperation with Belarus to counter-balance the
eastward extension of the NATO and even make the Baltic States an
‘exclave’ in a strategic sense.9 With regard to Kaliningrad, geopoliticians
suggest providing Russia with the freedom of the civilian and military transit
via Lithuania similar to those granted to Germany in the case of East
Prussia after World War I. Should Vilnius disagree, the realists suggest
questioning the territorial integrity of Lithuania, which acquired some Polish,
Belorussian and German territories as a result of the Molotov-Ribbentrop
Pact and World War II.10
2. The liberal institutionalists point out that the military significance of the
region decreased in the post-Cold War period and that the region is unable
to play the role of the Russian military outpost. This change was proved at
the doctrinal level. According to the previous Russian military doctrine
(1993), the use of nuclear weapons had been limited to circumstances that
constituted a “threat to the very existence of the Russian Federation as an
independent sovereign state.” According to the new doctrine (2000), the use
of nuclear weapons is justified “if all other means of resolving the crisis
situation have been exhausted or proved ineffective.” Such a situation was
simulated in a maneuver carried out in the summer of 1999, which assumed
a NATO attack on the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad. According to the
scenario upon which the maneuver was based, Russian conventional strike
forces could withstand for only three days.11
The liberals hope that, due to its unique geo-economic location, the Russian
Northwest will be further opened up for international cooperation, becoming
a Russian “gate - way” region that could help Russia to be gradually
integrated into the European multilateral institutions.12 They believe that
priority should be given to the issues that unite rather than disunite regional
players - trade, cross-border cooperation, transport, environment, health
care, people-to-people contacts and so on. In this respect, they view the EU
Northern Dimension project as a beneficial framework for such a
cooperation.13 The liberals are convinced that, if the mutual trust was
developed, technical problems such as visa regime, border controls and
transport systems could be easily solved.
3. The globalists go further than liberals in terms of the possible
participation of Russia’s northwestern regions in international cooperation.
They believe that the processes of globalization and regionalization are
worldwide and that Russia cannot avoid them. According to this school of
thought, these two tendencies are intertwined in Northern Europe.14 On the
one hand, this subregion is a subject of dialogue between two global
players - the EU and Russia. On the other hand, there is a clear tendency to
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where the Russian Northwest could find a mission of its own.
The globalists suggest that Moscow should not thrust sovereignty-related
issues onto the regional agenda and should provide the Russian border
regions with additional powers concerning external relations. They call for
the EU to implement a “two - track” approach to cooperation with Russian
regions. In their view, “pioneer” regions - such as Kaliningrad, Karelia,
Novgorod and St Petersburg - can be put on the “fast track” in terms of
further cooperation with the EU. In particular, they hope that such Russian
regions could be part of the European Free Trade Area or even become
associate partners of the European Union (before the main part of Russia
acquires the same status). They insist on the feasibility of this model by
referring to some North European countries such as Finland and Denmark,
where some territories have special status with regard to relations with the
EU (Åland Islands, Greenland and Faeroe Islands, respectively). Similar to
the liberals, the globalists welcome any cooperative initiatives, including the
EU’s Northern Dimension.
Some radical sub-schools of globalist theory believe that we are living in a
world of increasingly obsolete state borders. International borders are
becoming so porous that they no longer fulfill their historical role as barriers
to the movements of goods, people, and ideas.15 This can be perceived as
being extremely close to some West European approaches that aim at
social integration, transfer of sovereignty and cross-border cooperation.
New states (or newly reborn states like Russia) naturally focus on borders,
security, exclusion, sovereignty and national economies.
The realist-geopolitical school currently dominates the Russian security
discourse. This leads to a discrepancy between the Russian and European
discourses on borders and their role in the future international relations
system. While the Russian discourse emphasizes the need to protect
national interests and territorial integrity, including external borders, Europe
increasingly finds itself in a post-modern world where borders are relatively
unimportant (within the EU itself) and the emphasis is put on cross- and
trans-border cooperation (in relations with the outer world).
Despite the dominance of the realist-geopolitical school in Russia, there are
some indications that alternative paradigms have also some influence on
policy-making.16 For example, Moscow indicated its interest in the Northern
Dimension initiative and presented its suggestions to be included in the
action Plan. Moreover, Russia’s medium-term strategy for the development
of its relations with the EU (2000-2010) characterizes the Northern
Dimension as an important priority in the EU-Russia relationship. The
document also underlined the possibilities regarding Kaliningrad as a pilot
region for the EU/Russia relationship and a test case for this relationship in
connection with the EU enlargement.17 It mentioned the option of a special
arrangement for Kaliningrad with regards to enlargement; it also hinted that,
if Kaliningrad turns out to be a successful test case, future cooperation
would cover Northwest Russia as a whole. The federal task program on
Kaliningrad (December 2001) is based on the same approach.18
A summary of the Russian discourse on Northern Europe cannot be
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diverse and creative. In terms of expertise, the Russian political leadership
now faces diversity rather than uniformity and can choose among different
views and options.
The Russian political discourse has already resulted in a number of
important changes in Russian security thinking on the Baltic Sea region.
Five main changes can be identified:
There is a clear shift from a ‘hard’ to a ‘soft’ security problematic.
This was unusual for the Russian strategy planners, because the
region has always been perceived as a zone of confrontation with the
West (from the Teutonic Order in the Middle Age to NATO in the Cold
War period). There was a high concentration of Russian armed
forces – both nuclear and conventional – in the region; the Russian
military always had a major influence in defining the future of the
region. With the emergence of the NDI, the NEI and other
collaborative initiatives, the ‘hard’ security issues lost their former
importance and a completely new agenda is approaching. The
regional agenda was desecuritized (the notion of ‘desecuritization’
came from social constructivism and implies the reduced importance
of military/‘hard’ security issues and the rise of the ‘low politics’
agenda – see below); the regional cooperation focused on ‘normal’,
non-security issues. ‘Grand’ policy retreated to the wings and ‘low
politics’ (economy, trade, societal issues, ecology, border
infrastructure, migration, etc.) dominated the scene. This ‘soft’
security agenda questioned the role and capabilities of the old actors
(NATO, OSCE, etc.) in dealing with a new set of challenges. It seems
that the EU, the Nordic institutions and some newly created
organizations (CBSS, BEAC) are better equipped to tackle new
problems than the traditional actors. It took some time for Russian
foreign and security policies to become accustomed to the new
reality.
1. 
The Northern Dimension project casts doubt on the key principle of
the European Cold War security architecture - that European security
is indivisible. Under the new circumstances, it became possible to
make a region or subregion (such as Northern Europe) more secure
without creating a security regime for the whole continent. This again
challenged the role of the traditional security organizations (OSCE
and NATO) as the major security providers in Europe. Russia should
redefine its traditional European security policy, which aimed at
making the OSCE a main pan-European security institution.
2. 
For the first time in the Europe-Russia relations, projects such as the
NDI provide Russia with a certain freedom of choice. Prior to this,
Russia had to play by the rules laid down by the West. The Northern
Dimension suggests a rather loose frame for cooperation, inferring
that each partner acts on equal footing and decides itself how it
wishes to contribute to the cooperative process. The NDI invites
Russia to define for itself which issue to choose as a priority for
cooperation – energy, environment, societal issues, fighting
organized crime and so on. Since Moscow was not accustomed to
such a situation, it was unable to make a choice for a while. The
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failure of NDI, in order to be able to blame Brussels for the lack of
cooperation and goodwill rather than to take the initiative themselves
in designing a new political course.
Fourthly, and this will be explained in more detail afterwards, the NDI
also revealed that Moscow underestimated the role of
regionalism/subregionalism - both domestically and internationally.
Internally, Moscow viewed regionalism as a continuation of, or
addition to, the highly centralized federal policies at a local level.
Internationally, Russia saw the regional/subregional cooperation
either as a low priority (compared to ‘grand policy’) or as a scope for
diplomatic maneuvering (if the ‘grand strategy’ failed). Hence,
Moscow was quite suspicious of the subregional nature of the NDI,
the NEI and other projects. As a result of the deep involvement of the
Russian northwestern regions (especially Kaliningrad and Karelia) in
subregional cooperation, the federal government was afraid of
strengthening separatist tendencies in those areas. Only with time
did Moscow realize that subregionalism brings more positive than
negative results and begin to view the Russian Northwest as an
exception or ‘pilot’ region.19
4. 
Russia’s traditional concept of national sovereignty was challenged
by the post-Cold War dynamics. Moscow’s original position was that
all Russian regions were integral parts of the Russian Federation and
had equal status. International cooperation should not question any
region’s belonging to Russia and should not cause disparities
between different regions by involving some territories in a deeper
cooperation and rejecting others. Initially, Moscow feared that the
NDI, the NEI and similar projects could intensify such disparities and
provoke an unhealthy competition between Russian regions. Russia
insisted that it was able to solve the regions’ problems (even in case
of Kaliningrad) itself. With time, however, Moscow understood that
the international actors do not intend to challenge Russian territorial
integrity and that, by engaging Russia’s northwestern regions in
cross-border and transregional cooperation, their aim is to create a
zone of stability and economic prosperity rather than to disintegrate
the country. Gradually, Moscow’s preferences shifted from the
semi-isolationist, unilateral options to a cooperative model and
multilateral solutions (demonstrated in particular by the cases of
Kaliningrad and Karelia). (This means that, in the case of Kaliningrad
and Karelia, Moscow started a dialogue with the EU, the CBSS, the
BEAC, etc., with the aim to find solutions to the above problems and
accepted the assistance of these organizations via numerous
programs – TACIS, TEMPUS, INTERREG, etc.)
5. 
Russia-Europe cooperative agenda
Russian security policies in the Baltic Sea region have two major
components - ‘hard’ (military) and ‘soft’ (non-military - economic, societal,
environmental and other areas). As mentioned above, the ‘soft’ security
problematic is the most important one. The Russia-Europe collaborative
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Economy
The EU member states and Russia agree that economic cooperation should
be the main stabilizing factor in the region and, thus, the main content of the
Northern Dimension. According to diplomatic documents and suggestions
made by politicians, businessmen, academics as well as NGOs
(non-governmental organizations), the following priorities of the economic
cooperation can be identified within the Northern Dimension:
1. Energy
Balanced development of the energy infrastructure and the connection to
EU energy networks are high priorities for the NDI. According to EU
Commissioner Chris Patten, there are three priorities of the EU’s energy
policy in the region: 1) technical assistance to strengthen cooperation with
Russia; 2) improving program management to increase coordination of
existing EU programs and instruments; 3) joint activities with international
financial institutions and cooperation with industry to optimize the impact of
financial instruments in the energy sector20.
In October 1999, the conference of ministers of energy was held under the
auspices of the CBSS in Helsinki. The energy ministers identified two
essential areas for future energy cooperation: (a) organization and
integration of the electricity and gas markets, including the basis for
infrastructure investments; and (b) climate change policies, work on
renewals and energy efficiency.21
As a result of similar initiatives, a Baltic Sea Region Energy Cooperation
(BASREC) has been launched. Four ad-hoc groups have been created
within the areas of electricity, gas, climate issues and energy efficiency. The
dialogue between actors in the energy sector of the Baltic Sea region is an
important part of the process. The European Commission also contributed
to the BASREC secretariat in Stockholm.22
The EU Action Plan on the NDI outlines a number of concrete tasks ahead
of the regional actors, including: 1) the maintenance of an inventory of
regionally relevant energy projects and financial sources in order to
coordinate various activities and avoid duplication; 2) the promotion of
mutual transparency of strategic objectives and the availability of financial
support for the region; 3) Active participation by the EU in the activities of
the Group of Senior Energy Officials created by the energy ministers of the
region to define and manage the regional energy cooperation program; 4)
monitoring energy investments and structural changes in the sector; 5)
development of management capacity in the regional energy companies; 6)
development and transfer of new technologies to north-western Russia.23
Europe’s future energy management will depend heavily on gas originating
from Russia; one important route will go through Northern Europe.
According to some data, Russian gas will constitute 40 - 70 per cent of the
total EU gas consumption by the year 2020.24 On the other hand, Europe
will represent the most obvious export market for Russia’s gas, so there is a
clear meeting of interests here. Europe will need Russia, and vice versa.
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opportunities for increased commercial cooperation regarding natural gas.
The 1999 Helsinki Conference of Foreign Ministers on the Northern
Dimension stressed the need for close cooperation between producing and
consuming countries in establishing favorable commercial framework
conditions in the gas sector. There was a proposal to connect all continental
countries in the region to European networks, creating thereby a joint space
with common rules, and to ensure the security of supply and sufficient
storage capacities for gas.25
Projects related to oil are also under consideration. Latvia argues that the
building of a new oil pipeline from Russia to the port of Ventspils would be
economically more feasible and ecologically more sound than other similar
projects in the region.26 The EBRD (European Bank for Reconstruction &
Development) intends to provide financial support for such projects in order
to create healthy competition and promote the development of the regional
oil market.
As the conference of the Baltic Sea Energy Ministers demonstrated, the
countries of the region are considering the integration of electricity markets
and the establishment of commonly accepted rules, market mechanisms
and environmental framework conditions.27
The Action Plan explicitly calls for EU-Russia discussions on
interconnecting EU and Russian electricity infrastructures and markets.28 In
particular, the NDI could focus on projects involving interconnections among
the countries of the region with a view to optimizing the sharing of
base-load, peak and spin-off reserve power, and to increasing trade in
electricity, the reliability of power supply and the quality of the service
through frequency stabilization.
2. Transport
It is generally accepted that the presence of an efficient transport system is
one of the key prerequisites for the promotion of economic ties in the Baltic
region. Therefore, transport development projects have become one of the
top priorities of the Northern Dimension. The Action Plan observed the
exceptional circumstances in the region: demands of winter transport (use
of icebreakers, expensive road maintenance), long EU external frontiers
and associated customs procedures as well as the proximity of the Arctic
and sub-Arctic areas and the subsequent high logistics costs to the
industry.29
One of the most important priorities emphasized by Poland, the Baltic
States, Russia and Finland is the development of the constituent parts of
the Crete/Helsinki multi-modal transport corridor, namely the Via Baltica, the
Rail Baltica and the Via Hanseatica projects. Given the special status of
Kaliningrad, the Action Plan suggests the modernization of Transport
Corridor IX D (Kaliningrad-Kaunas-Kaisiadorys).30 Other EU priorities
include the elimination of bottlenecks at border crossings, the improvement
of safety statistics in all transport modes and the harmonization of transport
legislation and regulations based on international agreements. Under the
TACIS (Technical assistance to the CIS) program, a special project is now
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The EBRD finances a number of railway projects in the region, for example,
the modernization of the Moscow-St. Petersburg railway link. The financial
institution is also engaged in the Ventspils Port Rail Terminal Project, which
is linked to the recently signed Ventspils Port Terminal Project (involving
private sponsors) and potentially to a Moscow Intermodal Terminal,
currently being developed by the EBRD and a major international
operator.31
3. Information technologies/telecommunications
According to the EU’s vision, the NDI offers a platform for accelerating
transition to the information society; this is especially relevant in areas
where great distances have to be covered and where the population is
sparse.32 A Northern electronic Dimension Action Plan is being developed
by the Council of Baltic States in partnership with the European
Commission, consulting the involved countries and the relevant regional
actors. The Northern eDimension Action Plan (NeDAP) aims at developing
the information technologies in the region to the level of EU and world
standards. The EU has established a website on the NDI. At the EU-Russia
summit in May 2001, both delegations articulated their support for the
NeDAP and pledged to make it an important priority in the NDI
framework.33 The NeDAP was adopted at a CBSS ministerial meeting in
Riga in September 2001.
4. Municipal infrastructure
Restructuring and modernizing the municipal infrastructure, which is
currently in a critical condition in Northwest Russia, could be one of the
priorities of the Northern Dimension. Other projects are already underway:
the EBRD-funded wastewater projects in Kaliningrad, Novgorod the Great
and St Petersburg and the public transportation project in Novgorod the
Great.
5. Support of private entrepreneurship
To date, the leading figure in cooperation in this sector is the EBRD. When
many participant Russian banks became insolvent towards the end of the
1990s, the EBRD established its own specialized Micro Finance Bank, in
order to help carrying out the program of lending to micro and small
businesses in Russia.34 Under the TACIS program, priority is given to the
adjustment of the legal and institutional framework and to the simplification
and streamlining of regulations for small- and medium-sized enterprises.
The EU Commission also plans to launch a new multi-annual program for
enterprise and entrepreneurship (2001-2006).35
Environment
Many of the key actors are consistent in ranking environmental problems
among the highest priorities of the Northern Dimension. According to the
Russian Foreign Minister, “There are many urgent issues that should to be
tackled immediately. Among them, I would like to mention a sound
environment and enhanced nuclear and radiation security. By the way, in
expanding the economic activities in Northern Europe, we should strictly
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acknowledges the importance of environmental problems for the NDI. For
example, an Environmental Work Program is now being developed with
Russia under the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA). Other
regional arrangements, such as the “Environment for Europe” (EfE)
process, the European Energy Charter, the Helsinki Commission and the
Baltic Sea Agenda 21, are designed to meet the ecological challenges.
Specialists identify the following environmental problems in Northwestern
Russia and the adjacent areas: water and terrestrial pollution; forest and
bog destruction; climate change; fisheries and the maritime environment,
and nuclear safety.
The EU attempts to pool the efforts of the international financial institutions
(IFIs), in order to promote ecological programs in the Northern Dimension
region. In March 2001, the NIB (Nordic Investment Bank) hosted the
Helsinki meeting of the IFIs to discuss the prospects for environmental
cooperation in Northern Europe. The meeting initiated a Working Group
between the four IFIs (the EBRD, the European Investment Bank EIB, the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development IBRD and the NIB),
the EU Presidency and European Commission. The group met three times
in 2001 in London to develop a proposal by the EBRD and others for the
establishment of a Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership.37 The
NDEP plan was presented to the Luxembourg ministerial conference on the
NDI in April 2001 and to the EU at the Gothenburg summit in June 2001;
the initiative was welcomed by both fora.
The NDEP aims at addressing environmental hot spots and the energy
efficiency of the NDI area, which are largely a legacy of the former planned
economy period and which have cross-boundary impacts. In the Russian
Northern Dimension area (NDA) in particular, the NDEP focuses on
problems such as waste water and solid waste collection and treatment,
rehabilitation of the municipal heating system and nuclear waste treatment.
Among the Russian NDA regions, the NDEP gives priority to the Archangel,
Kaliningrad, Leningrad, Murmansk, Novgorod and Pskov regions
(oblasts).38
Fighting organized crime
Cross-border crime is an important issue and a common concern,
especially the trafficking of drugs, money, contraband commodities, stolen
vehicles, and even human beings. These activities have a significant impact
on people’s lives, the pace of economic and political reforms and undercut
government revenues. At the operational level, the police, customs officers,
special services and border guards need to be trained to understand the
implications of the international laws and conventions signed by their
governments. Continual training for officials from these agencies will also
increase their ability to counteract illegal activities.
Russia cooperates with Europe both at the bilateral and multilateral levels in
this field. For example, a Russian-British Memorandum of Understanding on
Combating Organized Crime was signed in October 1997. Since 1996, the
Task Force on Organized Crime in the Baltic Sea Region (Visby Group),
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building cooperation between regional law enforcement agencies.39 The
group also deals with and coordinates action on illegal migration, money
laundering, stolen vehicles, highly taxed goods, the trafficking of drugs or
human beings, and corruption.40 Through its Operative Committee (OPC),
the Task Force has been conducting joint, multi-disciplinary law
enforcement operations. The Baltic Communication System BALTCOM
operates 24 hours a day. From the outset, Russia has been one of the most
active members of the Task Force. Duly, the perception of the Russian NDA
in the region is much better today than before commencement of the Task
Force activities.41
Although the EU/Russia PCA contains several clauses related to the fight
against crime, the EU-Russia cooperation on justice and home affairs (JHA)
is still at an early stage. The PCA Sub-committee on the fight against crime
began its dialogue on the PCA implementation in 1999. Stemming from the
Common Strategy on Russia, the EU Council adopted a plan in March 2000
on common action for Russia to combat organized crime, focusing on
judicial cooperation in criminal matters and on law enforcement
cooperation. Europol received a mandate from the Council to negotiate
cooperation agreements with certain third-party countries, including
Russia.42 Currently, the EU-Russia Action Plan on Organized Crime
concentrates on measures to combat double invoicing as an instrument of
organized crime in trade between the EU and Russia.43 A first ministerial
meeting on Justice and Home Affairs between the EU Troika and Russia
was held in April 2001. A second meeting followed in April 2002.
Border controls/visa regime
It is impossible to form a homogeneous economic space in Northern Europe
without liberalizing visa and customs regimes. The nations of the region
have expressed the view that it would be expedient to introduce more
favorable (comparable with the Schengen agreement) visa and customs
regulations for Russia. The multiple entry visa scheme of the present
Russian/Finnish border management regime, which was set up with the
support of INTERREG (EU´s program on inter-regional cooperation
program) and TACIS funds, might be replicated along the enlarged EU
border with Russia in combination with the negotiation of a re-admission
agreement.44 Elimination of the bottlenecks on the Russian border
crossings is also an important goal. A major part of the TACIS CBC (cross-
border-cooperation) assistance - 57.1 million Euro - was allocated to border
crossing projects including border management activities.
Some progress was made under the Danish EU presidency in the most
complicated issue – freedom of movement to and from Kaliningrad. In
October 2002, Russia, the European Commission and Lithuania reached a
compromise on transit to Kaliningrad via the Lithuanian territory. Special
simplified travel documents were introduced for persons traveling by train or
car. However, many technical details of introducing facilitated travel
documents (FTD) still remain to be resolved. Moreover, FTD is a temporary
solution and the problem will re-emerge once Lithuania joins the Schengen
Convention.
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discussing these issues. The BEAC, in particular, has developed a
methodology for a direct and very successful cooperation between Nordic
and Russian customs authorities that could also be applied elsewhere.45 In
June 1997, the first conference of the heads of border guards of the Baltic
region took place under the aegis of the CBSS in Helsinki. Under the
Russian chairmanship at the Conference, four special operations were
undertaken; 25 vessels that had violated the border regime were
confiscated immediately. Between 1999 and 2000, the Russian border
guards prevented an illegal transit of two tones of drugs from Afghanistan to
the Baltic Sea region.46
Illegal migration
Along with the liberalization of border controls, increased efforts should be
made to prevent illegal migration. Under the Finnish EU-Presidency in
1999, several meetings were organized on illegal migration. Russia has
occasionally taken part in meetings of the Center for Information,
Discussion and Exchange on Asylum (CIREA) and the Center for
Information, Discussion and Exchange on the Crossing of Frontiers and
Immigration (CIREFI), the Visa Group and other assemblies. The EU JHA
Committee analyzed relations with Russia in this context in its meeting on
the 4th of October 1999.47 The first ministerial meeting between the EU
Troika and Russia on the JHA was held in April 2001.48 These activities
should, however, be augmented by more regular and extensive programs
under the auspices of the NDI.
Human needs
1. Social problems
Unemployment is high in the Russian NDA; people are abandoning the
region for a better future elsewhere in Russia. Whole communities, such as
Nikel and Pechenga on the Kola Peninsula, now face an uncertain future.
Specialists believe that social welfare programs should focus on issues
such as (a) unemployment and retraining schemes, (b) care of children at
risk and (c) the elderly people.49
2. Health care
The health situation in some areas of Northwest Russia is deteriorating due
to the economic and social circumstances. Mass diseases, such as
tuberculosis, syphilis, hepatitis, diphtheria and HIV-AIDS, are increasing at
an alarming rate; the consequences transcend national borders. Medical
experts draw special attention to the dramatic rise in multi-resistant
tuberculosis bacteria. Drug abuse negatively affects work force productivity
and the rate of violent crime.
Therefore, it is vitally important to establish a regional cooperation aimed at
combating the spread of communicable diseases. Some health care
programs have already been initiated; Sweden launched an initiative to
intensify them and to get more players involved. A seminar for experts from
the Barents and Baltic Sea regions was held in Uppsala in January 2000 in
order to identify the weaknesses and the requirements for this
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on Communicable Disease Control. The BEAC also has a Public Health
Program.51 TACIS has a € 2m Northwest health replication project for the
Kaliningrad, Murmansk and Archangel regions. The project aims at
reducing health and social disparities across the border by supporting the
reform of the local health system.52 The EU report on the Northern
Dimension outlined three priorities in the area of public health: (1)
information in the field of public health; (2) early warning systems for
different health hazards and problems; (3) health promotion and disease
prevention. It was also underlined that an improved exchange of knowledge
and information between experts is very important.53
3. Education and research
The human resources and scientific capacities of the European North can
be developed through enhanced cooperation in training and research. This
is crucial for the success of reforms and in forming a new generation in
Russia. According to many experts, the NDI should pool and coordinate
numerous educational and research programs both under the aegis of the
EU (TEMPUS, COPERNICUS, INTAS, etc.) and the sponsorship of other
regional institutions (Nordic Council of Ministers, CBSS, BEAC). Priority
should be given to developing university and research centers focusing on
the regional problematic.
Northwestern Russia benefits from the second generation of EU programs
for education and training, such as YOUTH FOR EUROPE and TEMPUS III
(2000-2006). The aim of the latter is to reform the higher education system
in accordance with European standards. A number of public administration
projects seek to contribute to the training of local government officials and
the development of direct relations between local authorities. For instance,
the Municipal Training Center at the Kaunas University of Technology
(Lithuania) is successfully executing the program on training of the officials
from Kaliningrad in cooperation with the Democracy Support Fund of the
USA. Brussels believes that it is expedient to establish a permanent EU
educational unit for public administration officials.
There are a variety of instruments at the level of EU and EU-Russia
research cooperation to promote and finance joint research initiatives. The
EU-Russia Science and Technology Agreement, in particular, facilitate
cooperation and may lead to new joint initiatives.54 The EU Sixth
Framework Program for Research and Technical Development may be a
suitable venue to develop the RTD cooperation in the NDA through joint
projects, networking and training of researchers. A considerable number of
research projects, particularly on environmental and climatic conditions,
energy and transport issues as well as information technologies, are
currently being pursued.
4. Indigenous population of the Arctic
Experts suggest focusing on problems such as the preservation of natural
environment where these peoples live, their family economy and their
traditional cultures.55 It is considered important to respect the rights and
interests of indigenous peoples in the context of industrialization and
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Russia.56
'Hard' security: still matters?
As mentioned previously, ‘soft’ rather than ‘hard’ security issues are more
important in the post-Cold War period. This is particularly true for the Baltic
Sea area. With the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet
Union, Russia found itself in a completely new geopolitical situation:
1. Firstly, the Kaliningrad Region (Oblast) was separated from “Greater”
Russia by the newly independent states such as Lithuania and Belarus. The
new geopolitical situation led to numerous problems in areas such as
supplying the region with basic provisions, energy, raw materials and
equipment, transport, communications, military transit and travel. An
increasing feeling of isolation from “mainland Russia” is widespread in
Kaliningrad. For this reason, many experts prefer to term Kaliningrad a
Russian “exclave” rather then “enclave”.
2. Secondly, the military significance of the Russian northwestern regions
declined dramatically in the 1990s. The Russian military presence has
diminished significantly over the past ten years. For example, the current
number of military personnel stationed in the Kaliningrad Oblast is
estimated at between 18.000 and 25.000 men (from a total of 100.000
during the Cold War), plus some 5.000 border guard troops and some 1.000
internal forces. According to some reports, the number of troops stationed
in the enclave should be reduced to 8.600 by the year 2003.
In late 1997, the Kaliningrad Special Defense District (Kaliningradsky
Oboronitelny Raion, KOR) - the only remnant of the former Baltic Military
District - was abolished (including the 11th Army). The residual land units
were subordinated to the Commander of the Baltic Sea Fleet, which was
also cut drastically. In 1990 - 94, the KOR reduced the number of its tank
divisions from two to one. In 1996, the tanks division was abolished.
Between 1994 and 2000, the number of tanks fell from 1.100 to 829. By
1996, an artillery division was transformed into three brigades, an airborne
brigade was dismissed, and the number of surface-to-surface missile
brigades fell from three to one. Between 1990 and 2000, artillery pieces
were reduced from 677 to 330 and the number of combat aircraft fell from
155 to 28.57
Over the same period, the Baltic Fleet reduced the number of its
submarines from 42 (two strategic and 40 tactical) to two (all tactical), the
number of surface ships from 450 (39 principal combatants, 150 patrol and
coastal combatants, 120 mine warfare, 21 amphibious and 120 support
vessels) to 190 (6 principal combatants, 30 patrol and coastal combatants,
19 mine warfare, 5 amphibious and 130 support ships).58 The fleet is now
comparable – in terms of the number of ships – with the German and
Swedish navies. The configuration of the region’s military structure became
purely defensive. Many military analysts doubt that Kaliningrad, because of
its remoteness and low combatant efficiency, is actually defendable from a
strategic point of view.
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are now open for international cooperation; they have one of the most
liberal economic, customs and border/visa regimes in the entire Russian
Federation. The Kaliningrad Oblast is especially exemplary in this regard. A
Free Economic Zone (FEZ) and then a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) were
established in the region in order to attract foreign investment. BMW and
Kia, automobile giants from German and South Korea, respectively, opened
production lines in Kaliningrad; Norwegian ships are also repaired in the city
ports. Karelia and the Leningrad Region actively participate in cross-border
cooperation with Finland. In sharp contrast to its former image of a “military
outpost”, as was the case in the Cold War era, the Russian Northwest is
now perceived as the most pro-Western - or cosmopolitan - region in the
country. In this regard, it exemplifies the most dramatic change in economy,
society, foreign policy and mentality that happened in post-Communist
Russia.
However, it is too premature to ignore a ‘hard’ security agenda in the region.
Paradoxically, the end of the Cold War triggered some processes that were
interpreted by Moscow as being detrimental to its security interests.
Firstly, Russia lost two-thirds of the former Soviet Baltic coastline;
access to the Baltic Sea was significantly reduced. Moscow lost
almost everything it had persistently aspired over several centuries.
1. 
Secondly, with the collapse of the USSR, Kaliningrad - which had
been an essential component of the Soviet defense system in the
region - became an exclave with doubtful defense capabilities.
Presently, Kaliningrad has the appearance of a trap for the Baltic Sea
Fleet rather than Moscow's military outpost in the region. Moscow is
also very sensitive of any statements on a possible secession of
Kaliningrad, either in the form of a ‘Fourth Baltic Republic’ or it being
returning to Germany.59
2. 
Thirdly, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact deprived Moscow of its
most important strategic allies, Poland and East Germany.
3. 
Fourth, the collapse of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact
undermined the entire military structure in the northwestern part of
Russia. Moscow had to re-deploy and accommodate the troops
withdrawn from Eastern Europe and Baltic states. The system of
military command, logistic support and management in the area had
to be changed. The Russian strategic planners had to contemplate
how to defend vulnerable regions (including Kaliningrad), given the
geopolitical cataclysm and the shortage of funds, personnel and
ammunition.
4. 
Fifthly, Russia failed to prevent the rise of antagonistic regimes in the
three Baltic States. From the outset, the Baltic States aimed at
withdrawing from the Russian sphere of influence and favored the
pro-Western orientation.
5. 
Sixthly, the region's alliance system is shifting to the detriment of
Russian strategic interests around the Baltic Sea Rim. In a sense,
the NATO 'swallowed' East Germany. Poland is already a member of
NATO and the Baltic States are candidates for NATO membership.
The Polish and Baltic armed forces do not presently constitute a
serious threat to Russia's security, but, if modernized and
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the EU and obtaining WEU (Western European Union) observer
status, Finland and Sweden are no longer neutral. Moreover, some
fractions in these two countries are in favor of joining NATO. At the
same time, Russia is unable to create a strong military organization
within the CIS and thus counter-balance the eastward expansion of
the Western security institutions.
For these reasons, a ‘hard’ security problematic still plays some (albeit not
crucial) role in Russian policy towards the Baltic Sea region. The military
security issues could be identified as follows:
1. Force level and structure optimization. Despite a significant reduction in
the Russian armed forces in the Baltic Sea area, the type and size of land
and naval forces needed in the region are still unresolved. The Russian
military analysts failed to provide an adequate assessment of threats to the
region, of the needs and of the available resources.
Some specialists (close to the realist and geopolitical schools) believed that,
in view of NATO enlargement, further force reductions would be dangerous;
they suggested modernizing the Russian military structures and even
increasing military presence in the region (including a deployment of tactical
nuclear weapons) in the case of NATO extension.60 Other experts (mainly
from the liberal camp) consider the Russian Northwest as being
non-defendable from a strategic point of view and specify the changes in
the strategic environment and Russian military strategy. They also note that
Russia, due to economic considerations, simply cannot afford Soviet-style
armed forces. Moreover, they emphasize the need to overcome the image
of the region as a military outpost in order to develop cooperation with
European countries.61 A national discussion on military security of
Northwest Russia among military and civilian specialists is necessary to
resolve this dispute.
2. Conversion of the defense industry and infrastructure. The reduction of
the Russian armed forces and military acquisitions in the northwestern
regions made it necessary to adapt the local defense industry and retired
servicemen to the post-Cold War dramatic changes. Although the defense
enterprises still produce some naval armaments (especially for foreign
customers) and repair warships, the level of state defense orders is
insufficient to secure their existence. They are forced to restructure their
production towards civilian products and technologies. Given the general
economic crisis and the high competition on the local, national and
international markets, such a restructuring remains a difficult task. It is
advisable to develop a special program at federal level on the conversion of
the Northwestern Federal District's defense industry and the former military
personnel and infrastructure. Additional funds should be provided.
(Currently, both the federal and local governments lack conversion
programs; conversion continues without a clear plan, in a chaotic and
contradictory way. I suggest here the development of a special conversion
program to solve the problems of the regional defense industry. Both the
federal and regional governments should allocate funds for this purpose)
3. Military transit. The issue of military transit between Russia and Lithuania
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Russia and Lithuania signed an agreement regulating the use of Lithuania's
railway system and other transportation facilities for the withdrawal of the
Russian troops from the former German Democratic Republic until 1995.
Moscow, however, strove for a new accord on both military transit and a
comprehensive political agreement. After lengthy negotiations and
diplomatic conflicts, a compromise was reached. In January 1995, Moscow
and Vilnius exchanged diplomatic notes, culminating in Lithuania´s
agreement to extend the current rules for Russian military transit to KO
(Kaliningrad Oblast) until the end of 1995.62 Since then, the agreement on
military transit has been extended on a yearly basis.
The regional players, however, are dissatisfied with the status of the
Russian military transit. The issue became especially complicated in view of
the forthcoming EU enlargement. Russia stressed that military transit is
beyond the EU acquits and thus may be regulated with Lithuania on a
bilateral basis. Moreover, the Russians have recently voiced the desire to
review the existing agreement.63 Vilnius argues that it is impossible to
satisfy Russian demands, since Lithuania is obliged to coordinate its
policies with the EU.64 Brussels supports the Lithuanian position on this
matter.65
It seems expedient to form a joint Russia - Lithuania working group with
observers from the EU, in order to discuss the issue of the Russian military
transit in the context of EU extension and to draft a new agreement.
Consultations on the expert level could also be held in one of the
committees under the auspices of the PCA. Such an agreement should
adapt the existing document to the new reality and be very specific
regarding the intensity and conditions of military transit. This agreement
should be seen as part of the whole EU-Russia package on the Kaliningrad
issue.
4. NATO enlargement. This is still a security problem for Russia although it
is gradually moving from a purely military domain to political and
psychological domains. The Russian strategists realize that NATO
enlargement does not pose any significant military threat to Northwest
Russia; NATO has no intention to increase its military presence and
activities in the Baltic Sea region. Rather, NATO offers a platform for
sub-regional cooperation. For Moscow, however, the NATO extension is a
clear message that the West does not completely trust Russia in security
matters and does not want to accept it into the ‘inner circle’ or security
‘club’. Although the second round of NATO enlargement is perceived by
Moscow as less painful than the first one, it is not beneficial in improving
Russia’s relations with both NATO and the Baltic States. Rather, it makes
Russian Euro - skeptics and isolationists more influential and decelerates
Russia’s integration into a single Europe.
Before the Balts join NATO, a number of pre-conditions should be accepted.
Firstly, the Balts should agree to the so-called ‘Norwegian model’ - the
non-deployment of foreign troops and nuclear weapons in peacetime.
Secondly, NATO should refrain from the deployment of offensive arms on
the territory of the newcomers. Finally, the Balts should join the CFE
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to the new strategic situation.
Moreover, Russia and NATO should negotiate a cooperative agenda on the
Baltics. It should be noted that, in contrast with other regions and areas of
cooperation, it would be difficult to define such an agenda. The
Russia-NATO global collaborative agenda includes the fight against
international terrorism, non-proliferation, arms control, peace-keeping and
rescue operations. However, many of these problems simply do not exist in
the Baltic region. At the same time, NATO is hardly helpful in solving the
problems that can be really found in the region - economic and social
divergence between neighboring countries, degradation of the environment,
the spread of communicable diseases, illegal migration and trafficking of
human beings, the internationalization of organized crime and smuggling.
Other institutions - the EU, the Nordic Council, the CBSS and the IFIs - are
better equipped to tackle such a ‘soft’ security problematic.
It seems, however, that some niches can be found for Russia-NATO
cooperation. For example, Kaliningrad could be chosen as the location for a
joint Russia-NATO rescue center on the Baltics. Another joint institution - a
center for the prevention of dangerous activities - could be also situated
there. The NATO could also help in converting the local defense industry
and, at the same time, developing military-technical cooperation with
high-tech defense enterprises. The NATO’s naval forces could also utilize
the local shipyards to repair or modernize their vessels. NATO assistance in
developing rehabilitation and re-training schemes for retired officers and
housing programs would be appreciated. NATO’s academic programs could
prioritize the Russian Northwest, in an aim to support both natural and
social sciences. It might be advisable to resume the NATO Democratic
Institutions Fellowship program, which was quite helpful in bridging the gap
between NATO and Russian political and academic elites. The discussion
below addresses NATO’s possible contribution to arms control and CSBMs
(confidence-building and security measures) on the Baltics.
5. Arms control and CSBMs. In contrast with the rest of Europe, the Baltic
Sea region lacks a proper arms control regime. The only international arms
control agreement applicable to the Baltic Sea area is the CFE. Four Baltic
Rim countries - Denmark, Germany, Poland and Russia - are state parties
to this agreement. The Baltic States refused to abide by the treaty because
it was concluded at a time when they were part of the Soviet Union. Finland
and Sweden did not join the treaty because of their neutrality policy. The
CFE treaty targets the reduction of excess military equipment that is
essential for launching surprise attacks and initiating large-scale offensive
operations. Thereby, the agreement played a positive role in the prevention
of military confrontation and conflict in the area.
Similar to the 1990s, the second round of NATO enlargement provoked a
discussion on the future of the CFE. At the second review conference
(2001), Russia cautioned against admitting the Balts to NATO because of
the potentially adverse effect on the key provisions of the CFE Treaty,
especially those concerning the flank and the Central European stability
zone.66 To avoid potential damage by the NATO enlargement to the
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promote the disarmament process in the region, it should provide for further
cuts, probably 15 - 20 per cent below the present CFE levels. A new treaty
should include all OSCE states (i.e. the Baltic States, Finland and Sweden).
Unfortunately, the Baltic States and the non-aligned countries (Finland and
Sweden) still prefer the opt-out policies. NATO also continues to insist that
no formal linkage can exist between NATO enlargement and the CFE,
although it does not oppose the actual idea of the Baltic States joining the
treaty. As mentioned above, NATO could put pressure on the candidate
countries to join the CFE.
It should also be noted that the CFE Treaty is applicable only to land forces;
the naval military is generally excluded from the negotiation process.
Unilateral measures were reached on the reduction of naval armaments
and naval activities, but they were related to obsolete weapons and cannot
replace a real arms control regime. According to Volker Heise, the basic
hesitancy of some NATO nations regarding naval armaments limitations in
the Baltic Sea appears to be the belief that the initiation of naval arms
control in one of the seven seas could lead to restrictions on maritime
flexibility in the other seas.67 However, given the changing nature of
Russia-NATO relations, the two parties could initiate negotiations on naval
arms control to further improve security environment in the region.
Along with the arms control regime, CSBMs are very important element of
any regional security system. According to the Vienna Document of 1994,
the OSCE participant states should notify each other at least 42 days in
advance of military activities involving more than 9,000 troops or 250 battle
tanks, 500 ACVs (armored carrier vehicles), or 250 self-propelled and
towed artillery pieces, mortars and multiple-rocket launchers (100-mm
caliber and above); 3000 in amphibious landing, heliborne landing or
parachute drop. The air force is to be included in the notification if at least
200 airborne sorties, excluding helicopters, are flown. Military observers can
be sent to exercises involving up to 13,000 troops, or 300 tanks or 500
ACVs or 250 artillery pieces, mortars and multiple rocket launchers
(100-mm and above) or maneuvers foresee 3500 in airborne landing,
heliborne landing or parachute drop.68 In 1999, another Vienna Document
was adopted to develop new CSBMs in the area.
Despite this rather impressive record, much more could be achieved. In
particular, some experts believe that the extension of the CSBMs to the sea
could be a useful addition to the Vienna Documents regime in the region.69
In the case of NATO expansion to the Baltic States, the North Atlantic
alliance could refrain from military exercises on the territory of newcomers
(especially near the Russian borders, including the Kaliningrad Oblast).
Along spatial limitations, temporal limitations could be established on
Russian and NATO military activities in the region. Military-to-military
contacts, joint exercises, exchanges and visits should be encouraged. The
countries of the region should exchange information on their military
doctrines, defense budgets and spending as well as on major arms export
or import programs.
The Vienna Document 1999 encouraged the participant states to summon
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Seminar on military doctrines (June 2001) insisted on a continued
discussion on the evolution of military doctrines at the plenary sessions of
the Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC), further clarification of the nature
and objectives of military doctrines and defense policies, the FSC
contribution to the process of bringing closer military doctrines and the
existing arms control regimes, the impact of the military and technological
revolution on the possible use of force, strategic stability and arms control
prospects, and elaboration of a unified technology for the OSCE states
used in their military doctrines.70
The development of bilateral CSBMs should become an important priority
for the countries of the Baltic Sea rim. Initially, Russia was reluctant to
respond positively to the 1998 Finnish-Swedish proposal to adopt the
bilateral CSBMs arrangements; Moscow changed its mind later. In 2000,
Russia implemented bilateral CSBM accords with Estonia and Finland
(extra evaluation visit and exchange of information). In 2001, a CSBM
agreement was concluded between Lithuania and Russia. It provides for
one additional evaluation visit to units in Lithuania and the KO and for the
annual exchange of additional information about military forces on
Lithuanian territory and the KO.71 This accord was warmly received, not
only by Vilnius, but also by other neighboring states that interpreted this
step as Russia’s willingness to further open up the KO for international
cooperation. Bilateral CSBM arrangements could, in the future, expand their
scope to include new areas of possible cooperation.
In conclusion, the above recommendations (if implemented) could ensure
military security in the region and create a favorable atmosphere for
cooperation on the ‘soft’ security issues.
Conclusion
The post-Cold War period brought fundamental changes to Russian security
thinking and Russian policies towards the Baltic Sea region. Although the
realist/geopolitical paradigm still dominates the Russian security discourse,
the mainstream of Russian political thought does not perceive Northern
Europe as a zone of military confrontation with the West; it favors opening
up the Russian northwestern regions for international cooperation. The PCA
and the Northern Dimension are perceived as appropriate frameworks for
seeking adequate solutions.
In contrast with the past, when Northwest Russia was perceived as an
exclusively Russian problem, there is now a growing feeling among the
regional actors (including EU) that the region should be a sphere of shared
responsibility. This means that not only the Russian but also the EU policy
towards Northwest Russia should be radically revised. It also demands
international rather than unilateral efforts and solutions.
Moscow and Brussels agree in principle that the EU enlargement should not
involve an increase in dividing lines in Europe and that the freedom of
movement of people and goods in the region must be ensured. Both
assemblies support various collaborative projects, including economy,
trade, energy security, social system, health care, environment, and the
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conclusion of a special agreement on Kaliningrad to facilitate the Oblast’s
deeper integration into the European economic and legal space. There are
still numerous barriers to reaching such an agreement, stemming from the
inflexibility of the EU and Russian bureaucracies and legislation as well as
from the divergence of economic, political and security interests. However,
the positive dynamics in the EU-Russian relationship are obvious.
More generally, one of the most important lessons that can be drawn from
the Northern Dimension case is that the subregional cooperation is
becoming an increasingly important security factor in Northern Europe.
Subregionalism offers opportunities to develop Russian democracy and civil
society. Subregionalism need not imply the further disintegration of the
country. Instead, it serves as a catalyst for successful reforms and
international integration. Subregional cooperation facilitates the rise of a
mechanism of interdependence in Northern Europe and promotes mutual
trust and understanding among the nations. Thus, subregionalism helps to
solve local security problems and to prevent the rise of new threats and
challenges. If Russia and the EU are able to exploit fully the opportunities of
subregionalism, Northern Europe would become a ‘success story’ of
Russian - European cooperation.
List of abbreviations
ACV Armored Carrier Vehicles
BALTCOM Baltic Communication System
BASREC Baltic Sea Region Energy Cooperation
BEAC Barents-Euro-Arctic Council
CBSS Council of the Baltic Sea States
CFE Conventional Forces in Europe
CIREA Center for Information, Discussion and Exchange on Asylum
CIREFI Center for Information, Discussion and Exchange on the Crossing of
Frontiers and Immigration
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States (former Soviet Union)
CSBM Confidence and Security Building Measures
EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EFTA European Free Trade Area
EU European Union
FSC Forum for Security Cooperation
FTD Facilitated Travel Documents
IFI International Financial Institutions
INTERREG Inter Regional Cooperation Program
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KO Kaliningrad Oblast
KOR Kaliningradsky Oboronitelny Raion (Kaliningrad Special Defense District)
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDA Northern Dimension Area
NDEP Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership
NDI Northern Dimension Initiative
NeDAP Northern electronic Dimension Action Plan
NEI Northern Europe Initiative
NIB Nordic Investment Bank
OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PCA Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
RTD Research and Technology Development
SEZ Special Economic Zone
TACIS Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States
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